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Steganography is an ancient art that encompasses various techniques of information hiding, the aim of 
which is to embed secret information into a carrier message. Steganographic methods are usually aimed at 
hiding the very existence of the communication. Due to the rise in popularity of IP telephony, together 
with the large volume of data and variety of protocols involved, it is currently attracting the attention of 
the research community as a perfect carrier for steganographic purposes. This paper is a first survey of the 
existing VoIP steganography methods and their countermeasures.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IP telephony or Voice over IP (VoIP) is a real-time service which enables users to 
make phone calls through IP data networks. It is one of the most important services 
of IP-based networks and is impacting the entire telecommunications landscape. 
An IP telephony connection consists of two phases in which certain types of traffic 
are exchanged between the calling parties: signalling and conversation phases. 
During the first phase certain signalling protocol messages, for example SIP (Session 
Initiation Protocol) messages [Rosenberg et al. 2002], are exchanged between the 
caller and callee. These messages are intended to set up and negotiate the connection 
parameters between the calling parties. During the second phase two audio streams 
are sent bi-directionally. RTP (Real-Time Transport Protocol) [Schulzrinne et al. 
2003] is most often utilised for voice data transport and thus packets that carry the 
voice payload are called RTP packets. The consecutive RTP packets form an RTP 
stream. 
Steganography is an ancient art that encompasses various information hiding 
techniques, whose aim is to embed a secret message into a carrier (steganogram). 
Steganographic methods are aimed at hiding the very existence of the 
communication and therefore keep any third-party observers unaware of the 
presence of the steganographic exchange. Steganographic carriers have evolved 
through the ages and are related to the evolution of the methods of communication 
between people. Thus, it is not surprising that current telecommunication networks 
are a natural target for steganography and in particular, IP telephony is attracting 
the attention of the steganography research community. It is because of the following 
features that IP telephony is a perfect carrier for steganographic purposes: 
— It is very popular, thus its usage will not raise suspicions, i.e., it will not be 
considered as an anomaly itself. 
— The large volume of VoIP data. The more frequent the presence and utilisation of 
such carriers in networks, the better their masking capacity, as hidden 
communications can pass unnoticed amongst the bulk of exchanged data.  
— Potentially high steganographic bandwidth that can be achieved. For example, 
during the conversation phase of a G.711-based call, each RTP packet carries 20 
ms of voice; in this case the RTP stream rate is 50 packets per second. Thus, even 
by simply hiding 1 bit in every RTP packet we gain quite a high steganographic 
bandwidth of 50 bit/s. 
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— It involves the combined use of a variety of protocols. Thus, many opportunities for 
hiding information arise from the different layers of the TCP/IP stack. Hidden 
communication can be enabled by employing steganographic methods applied to 
the users’ voice that is carried inside the RTP packets’ payload, by utilising so 
called well-known digital media steganography, or by utilising VoIP protocols as a 
steganographic carrier. This makes VoIP a multi-dimensional carrier. 
— It is a real-time service, which induces additional strict requirements for 
steganographic methods and its detection (steganalysis) ones. It also 
simultaneously creates new opportunities for steganography (e.g. utilisation of 
excessively delayed packets that are discarded by the receiver without processing, 
because they cannot be considered for voice reconstruction).  
— The VoIP calls are dynamic and of variable length which make VoIP-based 
steganography even harder to detect. 
 
Presently, steganographic methods that can be utilised in telecommunication 
networks are jointly described by the term network steganography or, specifically 
when applied to IP telephony, by the terms VoIP steganography or steganophony 
[Lubacz et al. 2008]. These terms pertain to the techniques of hiding information in 
any layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack (Fig. 1), including techniques applied to the 
speech codecs, or those that utilise the speech itself. 
 
 
Fig. 1. VoIP stack and protocols. 
 
In general, steganography can be treated as a double-edged sword depending on who 
uses it and how. However, the ethical issues related to the utilisation of information 
hiding techniques require consideration in a broader steganography context, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The main application of network steganography is for 
providing a means of conducting clandestine communication. The purposes for 
establishing hidden communication can be varied; possible uses can fall into the 
category of legal or illicit activities. The illegal aspect of steganography starts from 
criminal communication, through confidential data exfiltration from guarded 
systems, cyber weapon exchange and control, up to industrial espionage. Legitimate 
uses include circumvention of web censorship and surveillance, computer/network 
forensics, or copyright protection. Techniques can be used with VoIP to improve its 
resistance to packet losses and improve voice quality [Aoki 2003; 2004], extend 
communication bandwidth [Aoki 2007] or provide means for secure cryptographic key 
distribution [Huang et al. 2011a]. 
 The expansion of TCP/IP networks opened up many possibilities for covert 
communication due to changes in the traditional circuit-switched networks 
paradigm; services/applications are created by the network users rather than by the 
network itself, the transport and control functions are not separated and can be 
influenced by the user. These possibilities are a consequence of the fact that network 
users can influence, and/or use the control of data flow – the communication protocols 
– together with the service/application functionality of terminals to establish covert 
communication. That is why secret messages can be hidden, not only within ordinary 
non-covert (overt) messages as in traditional steganography and circuit-switched 
networks, but also in the communication protocol’s control elements, in effect by 
manipulation of the protocol’s logic, or by combinations of the above.  
 A considerable number of steganographic methods have been developed so far 
[Zander et al. 2007; Bender et al. 1996] and they cover all layers of the TCP/IP stack. 
Moreover, many of the previously proposed steganographic methods can be 
successfully adapted to VoIP traffic and many new VoIP-specific methods have been 
introduced and they are covered in this survey. However, if we look at VoIP from the 
perspective of traffic, then in general, every VoIP steganography technique can be 
classified into one of the three following groups (Fig. 2) [Lubacz et al. 2008] based on 
what is used as the steganographic carrier: 
— S1: steganographic methods that modify protocol PDU (Protocol Data Unit) – 
network protocol headers or payload field. Examples of such solutions include: (1) 
modifications of free/redundant headers’ fields of IP, UDP or RTP protocols during 
conversation phase and (2) modification of signalling messages in e.g., SIP (using 
the same principle as in [Murdoch and Lewis 2005]), or (3) modification of the RTP 
packets’ payload by modifying the user content that it carries (e.g., by employing 
widely used Least Significant Bits modification method [Bender et al. 1996]), or 
simply by replacing user data [Mazurczyk et al. 2011]. Obviously, methods that 
rely on modification of both the header fields and payload are also possible. 
— S2: steganographic methods that modify PDUs’ time relations, e.g. by modifying 
PDUs inter-packet delay [Wang et al. 2005], [Shah et al. 2006], by affecting the 
sequence order of PDUs (similarly like in [Kundur and Ahsan 2003]) or by 
introducing intentional PDU losses (by adopting solution from [Servetto and 
Vetterli 2001]).  
— S3: Hybrid steganographic methods that modify both the content of PDUs and 
their time relations. An example of such a solution is the LACK (Lost Audio 
Packets Steganography) method [Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski 2008], which will be 
described in Section 3. 
 
This classification quite precisely describes current information hiding possibilities in 
VoIP. However, it must be noted that the main focus of the research community in 
the last decade was dedicated to the methods from the S1 group. Solutions from the 
S2 group are harder to deploy practically, because they usually offer low 
steganographic bandwidth and require synchronisation. Moreover, they can 
significantly degrade the quality of the call. Methods from the S3 group are rather 
recent discoveries, thus to date, there have not been many papers on this subject. 
 It must also be noted that there are a number of information hiding techniques 
proposed for certain codecs, or audio files that could be also utilised for VoIP (for 
review of audio steganography methods interested readers are referred to the book 
edited by Lu [2005]). Also there are number of other existing steganographic methods 
e.g. protocol steganography ones that can be potentially utilized in VoIP 
environment. However, many of these have not been evaluated for VoIP per se, thus, 
they are intentionally omitted. Therefore, it must be emphasised that in this paper 
we focus only on these existing steganographic and detection methods that have 
been proved feasible for VoIP. 
 
 Fig. 2. VoIP steganography classification with exemplary methods 
 
This paper is a first review of the practical, existing VoIP steganography methods 
and countermeasures available during the period 2003-2012. The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the fundamentals of network 
steganography and VoIP steganography in particular. Section 3 describes the 
existing steganographic techniques, whilst Section 4 presents possible 
countermeasures and finally, Section 5 concludes this work. 
 
2. STEGANOGRAPHY: TERMINOLOGY, COMMUNICATION MODEL AND SCENARIOS 
As mentioned in Section 1, the means of communication amongst people has evolved 
over time; from messengers, letters (e.g., where sympathetic ink was used to 
facilitate hidden data exchange) and telephones, to computer networks and 
simultaneously, so have steganographic methods evolved. Therefore, techniques of 
hiding information that utilise network protocols can be viewed as an evolutionary 
step of the hidden data carrier, rather than some new phenomenon. 
 The scientific community has been using many terms such as steganography 
[Petitcolas et al. 1999; Fridrich 2010], covert channels [Lampson 1973; DoD 1985], or 
information hiding [Petitcolas et al. 1999] to describe the process of concealing 
information in the digital environment. This stems from the fact that the terms have 
not been introduced at the same time and because their definitions have evolved. 
However, in our opinion drawing a distinction between steganography and covert 
channels in telecommunication networks environment, is not necessary and instead, 
one term – network steganography – should be used. It is our belief that in this case 
steganographic methods are used to create a covert (steganographic) channel. Thus, 
the scope of network steganography encompasses all information hiding techniques 
that can be applied in telecommunication networks to enable hidden data exchange. 
 The best example to prove this point is in fact IP telephony services. Due to its 
nature, information hiding is possible within the speech that is carried inside the 
voice packets and in the modification of the protocols that enables it. The carrier is 
actually the same; the VoIP service and the methods used in both cases are 
inseparably bound to the process of communicating through the network. That is 
why, when considering steganography applied to the VoIP service, terms such as; 
VoIP steganography or steganophony should be used. 
 Another argument against using two separate terms is that in the state of the art 
for steganography [Petitcolas et al. 1999] as well as for covert channels [Zander et al. 
2007] the same model is referenced as a hidden communication model. It is the 
famous “prisoners' problem” which was first formulated by Simmons [1984] in 1983 
(Fig. 3). In this model two prisoners; Alice and Bob, are jailed in separate cells and 
they are trying to prepare an escape plan. The problem is that their communication 
is always passed through and inspected by the Warden. If the Warden identifies any 
conspiracy, he will put them into solitary confinement, so Alice and Bob must find a 
way to exchange hidden messages for their escape plan to succeed. The solution is to 
use steganography. By concealing a hidden message (MHID) in an innocent looking 
carrier (MCAR), it is possible to achieve a modified carrier (MSTEG) that will raise no 
suspicions while traversing the communication channel. Thus, to be able to create a 
covert channel in which hidden data is exchanged, the utilisation of a steganographic 
method by the sender (FSTEG in Fig. 3) and by the receiver (F-1STEG in Fig. 3) is always 
necessary. For Alice and Bob, the communication channel is also a covert channel 
that was created using given a steganographic method. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Model for hidden communication. 
 
The similarity between these two terms (steganography and covert channel) was in 
fact also observed by other researchers in the field (e.g., by Fridrich [2010]).  
 For steganographic methods, it is usually assumed that there exists a secret stego-
key (KSTEG in Fig. 3) that is a form of shared secret between the communicating 
parties and allows to build security of steganographic system. In network 
steganography, knowledge of how the information hiding technique operates can be 
also treated as a stego-key. Therefore, everything else related to the steganogram 
transmission can be known to the warden – the entity that performs detection 
(steganalysis). In particular it: 
— is aware that Alice and Bob can be utilising hidden communication to exchange 
data in a covert manner. 
— has a knowledge of all existing steganographic methods, but not of the one used by 
Alice and Bob (this, as mentioned earlier, is assumed to be their stego-key).  
— is able to try to detect, and/or interrupt the hidden communication. 
 
For VoIP steganography, four possible hidden communication scenarios may be 
considered, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The first scenario (marked with 1 in Fig. 4) is 
most common: the sender and the receiver perform VoIP conversation while 
simultaneously exchanging steganograms. The conversation path is the same as the 
hidden path. For the next three scenarios (marked 2-4 in Fig. 4) only a part of the 
VoIP end-to-end path is used for the hidden communication, as a result of actions 
undertaken by intermediate nodes; the sender and receiver are, in principle, unaware 
of the steganographic data exchange. The possible localisations of the warden are 
denoted as W1-W3 and will be discussed in detail in Section 4. 
  
Fig. 4. Model for hidden communication (based on [Lucena et al 2004] and [Zander 
et al. 2007]). 
 
 Every network steganographic method can be described typically by the following 
set of characteristics: its steganographic bandwidth (also referred as capacity 
typically for media steganography), its undetectability (also referred as security in 
literature Fridrich [2010]), and robustness. The term “steganographic bandwidth” 
refers to the amount of secret data that can be sent per unit time when using a 
particular method. Undetectability is defined as the inability to detect a steganogram 
within a certain carrier. The most popular way to detect a steganogram is to analyse 
the statistical properties of the captured data and compare them with the typical 
values for that carrier. The last characteristic is robustness that is defined as the 
amount of alteration steganogram can withstand without secret data being 
destroyed. 
 Of course a good steganographic method should be as robust and hard to detect as 
possible while offering the highest bandwidth. However it must be noted that there is 
always a fundamental trade-off among these three measures necessary. 
 Additionally, it is useful also to measure the steganographic cost. It is a 
characteristic that belongs to the sphere of carrier fidelity and has direct impact on 
undetectability. It describes the degradation or distortion of the carrier caused by the 
application of the steganographic method: similarly as MSE (Mean-Square Error) or 
PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) were utilized for digital media carriers. In the 
case of VoIP steganography methods, this cost can be expressed, for example, by 
providing a measure of the conversation quality degradation induced by applying a 
particular information hiding technique. 
3. VOIP STEGANOGRAPHY 
IP telephony as a hidden data carrier can be considered a fairly recent discovery. 
However, existing VoIP steganographic methods stem from two distinct research 
origins.  
 The first is the well-established image, audio and video file steganography (also 
called digital media steganography) [Bender et al. 1996], which has given rise to 
methods that target the digital representation of the transmitted voice as the carrier 
for hidden data.  
 The second sphere of influence is the so-called covert channels (comp. Section 2), 
created in different network protocols [Kundur and Ahsan 2003; Murdoch and Lewis 
2005] (a good survey on covert channels can be found in [Zander et al. 2007]), also 
referred in literature as protocol steganography [Lucena et al. 2004]; these solutions 
target specific VoIP protocol fields (e.g. signalling protocol – SIP, transport protocol – 
RTP, or control protocol – RTCP), or their behaviours.  
 In the following subsections we analyse VoIP steganography methods taking into 
account the two research origins mentioned above. In each case chronology is 
retained. 
3.1 Steganographic methods applied to voice payload 
All information hiding methods described in this subsection belong generally to the 
group S1 from classification presented in Fig. 2 (modifying the payload of the VoIP 
PDU’s). 
 
3.1.1. LSB-based methods applied to digital voice signal 
Surprisingly, a lot of research effort is still devoted for improving LSB (Least 
Significant Bit) steganography. However, it must be noted that some of the 
techniques described below can be successfully applied also to other VoIP 
steganography methods to increase their undetectability, robustness or 
steganographic bandwidth.  
 The first VoIP steganographic method to utilise the digital voice signal as a hidden 
data carrier was proposed by Aoki [2003] in 2003. The LSB steganography was 
utilised to provide PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) method for G.711-based VoIP. 
Later, the PLC method was further improved ([Aoki 2004; 2007]), but the 
steganographic method and voice codec remained the same. 
 Dittmann et al., [2005] in 2005 presented the first VoIP steganography 
implementation prototype that also used the LSB method. This work was further 
extended and published in 2006 [Krätzer et al. 2006] by demonstrating testing which 
proved that a typical VoIP communication can be practically used for steganographic 
purposes. 
 Wu and Yang [2006] described the scheme of adaptive LSB, which for G.711-based 
speech calculates energy statistics to estimate the number of least significant bits to 
be utilised as a hidden data carrier in each voice sample. The results proved that this 
approach performs better than simple LSB and offers a higher steganographic 
bandwidth (about 20 Kbps) while introducing less degradation of the voice quality. 
 In [Druid 2007], an implementation of SteganRTP was described. This tool 
employs the least significant bits of the G.711 codec to carry steganograms and offers 
a reliable bi-directional covert communication channel that allows to exchange 1 kB/s 
of secret data in single direction. 
 Wang and Wu [2007] also suggested using the least significant bits of voice 
samples to carry secret communication, but in their solution the bits of the 
steganogram were coded using a low rate voice codec, like Speex. Their prototype 
implementation is characterised by a small processing delay of about 0.257 ms. 
 Takahashi and Lee [2007] presented a proof of concept LSB-based implementation, 
Voice over VoIP (Vo2IP), which is able to establish a hidden communication by 
embedding 8kbit/s G.729-based compressed voice data into the regular, PCM (Pulse 
Code Modulation)-based, voice traffic. 
 Liu et al. [2008] found that the LSBs of each speech frame for G.729 can be 
replaced with secret data bits. The experimental results indicate that the method is 
perceptually transparent while the steganographic bandwidth is relatively high 
(about 200 bit/s). 
 Huang et al. [2008] described how to use the LSB matching method to enable 
covert communication for VoIP. They developed a G.711-based prototype called 
Stega-Talk that also offers the recovery of secret data lost due to network conditions. 
It is based on the Redundant Audio Data RTP payload type that is typically used to 
carry a DTMF (Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency) digit. 
 Tian et al. [2008] proposed the use of an LSB steganography-based system that 
employs a well-balanced and simple encryption of secret data. This system was 
evaluated for VoIP with G.729a speech coding using a proof of concept tool named 
StegTalk. The experimental results showed that the achievable steganographic 
bandwidth is in the range 0.8–2.6 kbit/s and has a negligible effect on speech quality. 
Moreover, it met the real-time requirements of the VoIP service. 
 A real-time steganography system for VoIP was described by Tian et al., [2009a]. 
The main novelty of the proposed solution is not in the steganographic method used 
(LSB), but in utilising M-sequence encryption techniques to eliminate the correlation 
amongst secret messages, to increase the resistance against statistical steganalysis. 
Moreover, protocol steganography (usage of free/unused fields in protocols headers) is 
used to provide a novel synchronisation mechanism together with an RSA-based key 
agreement that ensures accurate restitution of the secret messages on the receiver 
side. This system was experimentally evaluated for 0.8 and 2.6 kbit/s steganographic 
bandwidth, which obtained a 0.3 and 1 quality drop in the MOS (Mean Opinion 
Score) scale (which is typically used for expressing the quality of VoIP calls), 
respectively and the total embedding latency increased by about 4.7 ms when 1 MB 
of steganogram is transmitted. A similar LSB-based approach, relying on adaptive 
VoIP steganography was presented by the same authors in [Tian et al. 2009b]. 
 Xu and Yang [2009] proposed an LSB-based method dedicated to voice 
transmission using the G.723.1 codec in 5.3 kbit/s mode. They identified five least 
significant bits of the LSP VQ (Line Spectrum Pair Vector Quantization) indices and 
used them to transmit hidden data; the method provided a steganographic 
bandwidth of 133.3 bit/s.  
 Tian et al. [2010] described a Dynamic Matrix Encoding Strategy (DMES) that 
dynamically chooses the size of each message group in a given set of adoptable 
message sizes. The purpose of DMES is to flexibly adjust the steganographic 
bandwidth and embedding transparency in accordance with the requirements of the 
users. Its main advantage is that it is also codec and cover independent. 
 An adaptive steganography scheme based on the smoothness of the speech block 
was introduced by Miao and Huang [2011]. By choosing lower embedding rates in the 
flat blocks and higher in sharp ones the security of the method was improved. Such 
an approach outperforms the classic LSB-based methods in terms of voice quality. 
Experimental results showed that about 7.5 kbit/s of secret data can be sent covertly 
with a degradation of voice quality of less than 0.5 (expressed again on the MOS 
scale). 
 Tian et al., [2011a] presented an Adaptive Partial-Matching Steganography 
(APMS) approach. They introduced a partial similarity value (PSV) measure to 
evaluate the partial matching between covert and overt messages. This allows an 
adaptive balance of the steganographic transparency and bandwidth. Additionally, 
they utilise triple M-sequences to eliminate the correlation among secret messages, 
guide the adaptive embedding process, and encrypt synchronisation signalling 
patterns. 
 An insightful overview of the general techniques that can be applied to VoIP 
steganography methods to make their detection even more difficult was introduced 
by Tian et al., [2011b]. Additionally, they proposed three new encoding strategies 
based on digital logic. All techniques were evaluated for LSB-based steganography 
and proved to be effective. 
 Another adaptive LSB-based steganography approach named AVIS (Adaptive 
VoIP Steganography) was proposed by Xu et al. [2011]. AVIS has two components: 
VAMI (Value-based Multiple Insertion), which is responsible for dynamically 
selecting multiple bits based on the VoIP vector value and VADDI (Voice Activity 
Detection Dynamic Insertion), which dynamically changes the embedding intervals 
to make detection harder. The approach was implemented for G.711-based VoIP and 
the results prove that it is less detectable than a classic LSB method whilst achieving 
a steganographic bandwidth of about 114 B/s, introducing acceptable delay and 
degrading the voice from 0.1 to 0.4 on MOS scale. 
 Liu et al. [2012] adopted least-significant-digits rather than LSBs to hide secret 
data. This approach can increase around 30% of steganographic bandwidth while 
introducing lower steganographic cost than classic LSB method. 
 
3.1.2. Other methods 
Besides LSB-based information hiding approaches other effective methods that 
utilize speech as a secret data carrier we proposed. These solutions are generally 
based on: 
 Phase coding ([Takahashi and Lee 2007], [Nutzinger and Wurzer 2011]),  
 QIM (Quantization Index Modulation) technique ([Xiao et al. 2008]), 
 Spectrum techniques in transform domain ([Takahashi and Lee 2007], 
[Nutzinger et al. 2010]),  
 Echo hiding technique ([Takahashi and Lee 2007]),  
 Analysis by synthesis (ABS)-based scheme ([Ma et al. 2007], [Wu et al. 
2009]),  
 DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) technique ([Deng et al. 2008]) 
 Speech codec-specific approaches ([Aoki 2008, 2009, 2010], [Geiser et al. 
2008], [Nishimura 2009], [Huang et al. 2011b]), 
 
 Takahashi and Lee in [2007] besides LSB method considered the feasibility of 
other methods that can be utilised in VoIP steganography, like DSSS (Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum), FHSS (Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum), or Echo 
hiding. They also provided experimental results of steganographic bandwidth, which 
was about 20 bit/s for all three techniques, while still maintaining good voice quality 
robustness. Nutzinger et al. [2010] further improved DSSS by creating a hybrid 
steganographic algorithm that combined DSSS with frequency hopping and bit-rate 
variation. Authors also implemented a prototype and stated that the proposed 
scheme has none to negligible influence on the speech quality. 
 Ma et al., [2007] adopted an ABS (Analysis-By-Synthesis) algorithm [Wu et al. 
2003] to enable hiding of 2.4 kbit/s MELP (Mixed-Excitation Linear Prediction) 
speech in G.721-based overt speech. The obtained steganographic bandwidth was 
estimated up to 8 kbit/s. Also ABS was utilized by Wu et al. [2009] to build an 
information hiding scheme based on LPCs (Linear Predictive Coefficients) as the 
secret data carrier by means of LPCs substitution. The experimental results for four 
speech codecs: G.721, GSM, G.728 and G.729 proved that the proposed approach is 
characterised by high steganographic bandwidth (from 800 to 3600 bit/s) while 
offering good undetectability, robustness and ability to perform in real-time. The 
results were also compared with four traditional information hiding technologies: 
LSB, echo hiding, phase encoding and spectrum transform and also showed to be 
superior. 
 A steganographic method based on the characteristics of PCMU (PCM µ-law) in 
which the 0-th speech sample can be represented by two codes due to the overlap 
(namely +0 and -0) was proposed by Aoki [2008]. This redundancy is then exploited to 
embed hidden data into the speech. This technique is lossless, thus there is no voice 
degradation. The obtained steganographic bandwidth of this method was estimated 
to be in the range 4.4–24 kbit/s depending on the extent of the background noise 
level. The work was later extended and published in 2009 [Aoki 2009] and studied 
lossless steganography techniques for G.711 PCMU and DVI-ADPCM (DVI Adaptive 
Differential Pulse Code Modulation) codecs. The proposed techniques also exploit the 
redundancy of the folded binary code employed in these codecs for embedding a 
steganogram into the speech without quality degradation. The improved technique 
offers steganographic bandwidth for G.711-based calls from 24 to 400 bit/s and from 0 
to 8 bit/s for ADPCM-based calls, again depending on the background noise level. 
Also, the semi-lossless variant of this technique for increased steganographic 
bandwidth was considered in 2010 [Aoki 2010]. 
 The PLC algorithm intended mainly for wireless VoIP systems, which rely on the 
specific side information that is communicated via a covert channel within the 
speech, was presented by Geiser et al. [2008]. To enable hidden transmission the 
ACELP (Algebraic Code-Excited Linear Prediction) codebook (or fixed codebook, 
FCB) is partitioned into sub-codebooks that uniquely identify the selected secret 
message’s bits. Prototype AMR (Adaptive Multi-Rate)-based implementation was also 
described and a 2 kbit/s steganographic bandwidth was achieved experimentally. 
 An interesting algorithm for QIM (Quantization Index Modulation) that can be 
utilised for low bit-rate speech streams was introduced by Xiao et al., [2008] and later 
named CNV-QIM (Complementary Neighbour Vertices-Quantisation Index 
Modulation) [Li et al. 2012]. It is based on dividing the codebook into two parts, each 
representing ‘0’ and ‘1’, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between codewords is 
considered using the CNV (Complementary Neighbour Vertices) algorithm. This 
guarantees that every codeword is in the opposite part to its nearest neighbour, thus 
giving a bound of distortion. Experiments for iLBC (Internet Low Bit Rate Codec) 
and G.723.1 speech codecs proved that the proposed method is effective, as it only 
slightly decreases the speech quality whilst providing a steganographic bandwidth of 
100 bit/s. 
 Deng et al., [2008] proposed a concept of Covert Speech Telephone (CST) that is 
intended to provide secure covert voice communication. This approach utilises a 
robust DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform) watermarking scheme to hide covert speech 
in the G.711-based VoIP stream. The main innovation is to use speech recognition to 
efficiently reduce the size of the secret information, encrypt it and hide it in the 
existing overt VoIP call. 
 An interesting study is described in [Nishimura 2009], where author proposed 
hiding information in the AMR-coded stream by using an extended quantisation-
based method of pitch delay (one of the AMR codec parameters). This additional data 
transmission channel was used to extend the audio bandwidth from narrow-band 
(0.3–3.4 kHz) to wide-band (0.3–7.5 kHz). 
 Nutzinger and Wurzer [2011] introduced novel approach to speech phase coding. 
Typically, the original phase values are replaced with some random data. In proposed 
scheme the original phase values are preserved to retain high voice quality. The 
algorithm embeds secret data by introducing a configurable phase difference between 
the mean of selected chunks of the phase spectrum. Experimental results prove that 
the proposed method can achieve up to 12.5 bit/s while introducing almost no 
degradation on the voice signal, good robustness and security. 
 A high-capacity steganography technique based on the utilisation of inactive 
frames of G.723.1 speech codec was introduced by Huang et al. [2011b]. The authors 
prove that the inactive frames of VoIP streams are more suitable for data embedding 
than the active ones, thus more hidden data can be embedded in them with the same 
imperceptibility. They then proposed a steganographic algorithm in different speech 
parameters of the inactive frames for G.723.1 codec with 6.3 kbit/s bitrate. 
Experimental results show the solution is imperceptible and a high steganographic 
bandwidth up to 101 bits/frame is achieved. 
 
 The following table summarises most important characteristics of the 
steganographic methods outlined in subsection 3.1. 
 
Table I. Summary of the VoIP steganography methods applied to voice payload 
 
New concept 
for VoIP 
environment 
New 
application 
for VoIP 
Extension 
of existing 
VoIP 
method 
Improvement of: 
Undetectability Robustness 
Steganographic 
bandwidth 
Wang and Wu 
[2007] 
+ ― + N/A N/A N/A 
Dittmann et al. 
[2005], Aoki [2004, 
2007] 
― ― + N/A N/A N/A 
Aoki [2008], Deng et 
al. [2008], Xiao et al. 
[2008], Ma et al., 
[2007], Xu and Yang 
[2009]Huang et al. 
[2011b] 
+ ― ― N/A N/A N/A 
Aoki [2003], Geiser 
et al. [2008], 
Nishimura [2009] 
+ + ― N/A N/A N/A 
Takahashi and Lee 
[2007] 
+ + + ― ― ― 
Tian et al. [2008], 
Tian et al., [2009a, 
2009b], Miao and 
Huang [2011], Tian 
et al. [2011a], Tian 
et al. [2011b] 
― ― + + ― ― 
Tian et al. [2010] ― ― + + ― + 
Liu et al. [2008] + ― + + ― + 
Wu and Yang 
[2006], Huang et al. 
[2008], Xu et al. 
[2011], Liu et al. 
[2012] 
― ― + + ― + 
Aoki [2008,2010] ― ― + ― ― + 
Wu et al. [2009] ― ― + + + ― 
Nutzinger and 
Wurzer [2011] 
+ ― + + + ― 
 
3.2 Steganographic methods applied to VoIP-specific protocols 
3.2.1. Methods that modify PDU’s time relations (S2) 
Utilisation of the VoIP-specific protocols as a steganogram carrier was first presented 
by Wang et al. [2005] (later also described in [Chen et al. 2006]). The authors 
proposed embedding of a 24-bit watermark into the encrypted stream (e.g., Skype 
call) to track its propagation through the network, thus providing its de-
anonymisation. The watermark is inserted by modifying the inter-packet delay for 
selected packets in the VoIP stream. Authors demonstrated that depending on the 
watermark parameters chosen, they are able to achieve a 99% true positive and 0% 
false positive rate while maintaining good robustness and undetectability. However, 
they achieved steganographic bandwidth of only about 0.3 bit/s which is enough for 
the described application but rather low to perform clandestine communication.  
 Shah et al. [2006] inspected the use of injected jitter into VoIP packets to create a 
covert channel. It is intended to exfiltrate users’ keyboard activity e.g., 
authentication credentials and the authors also prove that such an attack is feasible 
even when the VoIP stream is encrypted. 
 A new kind of information hiding technique called interference channel was 
introduced by Shah and Blaze [2009], which creates external interference on a shared 
communications medium (e.g., wireless network) in order to send hidden data. They 
describe an implementation of a wireless interference channel for 802.11 networks 
that is able to successfully transfer a steganogram over data streams (with a rather 
low steganographic bandwidth of 1 bit per 2.5 seconds of the call) and that is proven 
to be especially well suited for VoIP streams. 
  
3.2.2. Methods that modify protocol PDU – protocol specific fields (S1) 
Mazurczyk and Kotulski [2006a] proposed the use of steganography in unused fields 
in the RTP protocol headers and digital watermarking to embed additional 
information into RTP traffic to provide origin authentication and content integrity. 
The necessary information was embedded into unused fields in the IP, UDP and RTP 
protocol headers, and also into the transmitted voice. The authors later further 
enhanced their scheme [2006b] by also incorporating a RTCP (Real-time Transport 
Control Protocol) functionality without the need to use a separate protocol, thus 
saving the bandwidth utilised by VoIP connection. 
 A broader view on network steganography methods that can be applied to VoIP, to 
its signalling protocol, SIP with SDP (Session Description Protocol) [2008a], and to 
its RTP streams (also with RTCP) was presented by Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski 
[2008b]. They discovered that a combination of information hiding solutions provides 
a capacity to covertly transfer about 2000 bits during the signalling phase of a 
connection and about 2.5 kbit/s during the conversation phase. In 2010 Lloyd [2010] 
extended [Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski 2008a] by introducing further steganographic 
methods for SIP and SDP protocols and by performing real-life experiments to verify 
whether they are feasible. 
 Bai et al., [2008] proposed a covert channel based on the jitter field of the RTCP 
header. This is performed in two stages: firstly, statistics of the value of the jitter 
field in the current network are calculated. Then, the secret message is modulated 
into the jitter field according to the previously calculated parameters. Utilisation of 
such modulation guarantees that the characteristics of the covert channel are similar 
to those of the overt channel. 
 Forbes [2009] proposed an RTP-based steganographic method that modifies the 
timestamp value of the RTP header to send steganograms. The method’s theoretical 
maximum steganographic bandwidth is 350 bit/s. 
 Real-life experiments with VoIP steganography on an SBC (Session Border 
Controller) that was acting as a gatekeeper at the borders of trust, were performed 
by Wieser and Röning [2010]. They were trying to establish whether SBC has some 
countermeasures against information hiding techniques based on SIP and RTP 
protocols. The results showed that it was possible to achieve a high steganographic 
bandwidth of even up to 569 kB/s. 
 Huang et al. [2011a] described how to provide efficient cryptographic key 
distribution in a VoIP environment for covert communication. Their proposed 
steganographic method is based on utilisation of the NTP field of the RTCP’s SR 
(Sender Report) as a hidden data carrier and offered steganographic bandwidth of 54 
bit/s with good undetectability.  
 The TranSteg (Transcoding Steganography) method that relies on the compression 
of the overt data in a payload field of RTP packets, in order to make free space for a 
steganogram, was introduced by Mazurczyk et al. [2011]. In TranSteg for a chosen 
voice stream, a codec that will result in a similar voice quality, but for a smaller voice 
payload size than the original, is found. Then, the voice stream is transcoded. At this 
stage, the original voice payload size is intentionally unaltered and the change of the 
codec is not indicated. Instead, after placing the transcoded voice payload, the 
remaining free space is filled with hidden data. The resulting steganographic 
bandwidth that was obtained using proof-of-concept implementation was 32 kbit/s 
while introducing delays lower than 1 ms, and still retaining good voice quality. The 
work was further extended by analysing the influence of speech codecs selection on 
TranSteg efficiency [Janicki et al. 2012a]. One of the interesting finding was that if 
the pair G.711/G.711.0 codecs are utilized TranSteg introduces no steganographic 
cost and it offers a remarkably high steganographic bandwidth, on average about 31 
kbps. 
 In [2012] Tian et al. experimentally evaluated steganographic bandwidth and 
undetectability of two VoIP steganography methods proposed earlier by Huang et. al 
[2011a] (LSBs of NTP Timestamp field of RTCP protocol) and by Forbes [2009] (LSBs 
of Timestamp field of RTP protocol). Authors utilized Windows Live Messenger voice 
conversations system and proved that by using the first approach steganographic 
bandwidth of 335 bit/s can obtained and by using the second 5.1 bit/s. The latter 
method is also harder to detect. 
 
3.2.3. Hybrid methods (S3) 
In [Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski 2008b] a novel method called LACK (Lost Audio 
Packets Steganography) was introduced; it was later described and analytically 
analysed in [Mazurczyk and Lubacz 2010]. LACK relies on the modification of both 
the content of the RTP packets and their time dependencies. This method takes 
advantage of the fact that in RTP, excessively delayed packets are not used for the 
reconstruction of the transmitted data by the receiver; that is, the packets are 
considered useless and therefore discarded. Thus, hidden communication is possible 
by introducing intentional delays to selected RTP packets and by substituting the 
original payload with a steganogram. Practical evaluation based on the LACK 
prototype was presented also by Mazurczyk [Mazurczyk 2012] where the method’s 
impact on the quality of voice transmission was investigated. The concept of LACK 
was further extended by Hamdaqa and Tahvildari [2011] by providing a reliability 
and fault tolerance mechanism based on a modified (k, n) threshold based on 
Lagrange Interpolation and results demonstrated that the complexity of steganalysis 
is increased. The “cost” for the extra reliability is a loss of some fraction of the 
steganographic bandwidth. 
 Arackaparambil et al. [2012] described a simple VoIP steganography method in 
which chosen RTP packets’ payloads are replaced with a steganogram and the RTP 
header’s sequence number, and/or timestamp fields are intentionally changed to 
make them appear as if they were excessively delayed by the network. This solution 
can be treated as a variation of the LACK method described above. 
  The following table summarises most important characteristics of the 
steganographic methods outlined in subsection 3.2. 
 
Table II. Summary of the VoIP steganography methods applied to VoIP-specific protocols 
 
New concept 
for VoIP 
environment 
New 
application 
for VoIP 
Extension 
of existing 
VoIP 
method 
Improvement of: 
Undetectability Robustness 
Steganographic 
bandwidth 
Wang et al. 2005], 
Shah et al. [2006], 
Mazurczyk and 
Kotulski [2006a, b], 
Shah and Blaze 
[2009], Huang et al. 
[2011a] 
+ + ― N/A N/A N/A 
Chen et al. [2006], 
Lloyd [2010], 
Arackaparambil et 
al. [2012] 
― ― + N/A N/A N/A 
Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski [2008a, 
b], Bai et al., [2008], 
Mazurczyk et al. 
[2011] 
+ ― ― N/A N/A N/A 
Forbes [2009], 
Wieser and Röning 
[2010], Mazurczyk 
and Lubacz [2010] 
― ― + ― ― + 
Janicki et al. 
[2012a] 
― ― + + + + 
Hamdaqa and 
Tahvildari [2011], 
Tian et al. [2012] 
― ― + + ― ― 
 
4. VOIP STEGANALYSIS 
For network steganography, as well as for digital media steganography, there is still 
no universal, “one size fits all” detection solution, thus, steganalysis methods must be 
adjusted precisely to the specific information hiding technique. That is why it is hard 
to compare existing VoIP steganalysis methods. However, it can be noted that as a 
classifier typically SVM (Support Vector Machine) is utilized which is state of the art 
solution for steganalysis in general. 
 Let us consider again the hidden communication scenarios from Fig. 4. For 
network steganography, there are three possible localisations for a warden (W1-W3), 
as mentioned in Section 2. A node that performs steganalysis can be placed near the 
sender, or receiver of the overt communication, or at some intermediate node. 
Moreover, the warden can monitor network traffic in single (centralised warden), or 
multiple locations (distributed warden). In general, the localisation and number of 
locations in which the warden is able to inspect traffic greatly influences the 
effectiveness of the detection method.  
 For example, in scenario (1) from Fig. 4 – if a warden operates in an overt/covert 
sender’s LAN (Local Area Network) then some steganographic methods (e.g., those 
that utilise the packets’ delay) can be trivial to detect. This is because the anomaly 
introduced into the packets’ stream will be easily spotted near the transmitter. 
However, if a warden is present only in the sender’s or receiver’s LAN, then for 
scenario (4) hidden communication will remain undiscovered. Similar conclusions can 
be drawn for a reverse case and for other communication scenarios. 
 Moreover, if a distributed warden is used that has access to the same traffic flow 
in several network localisations, then the warden’s effectiveness is likely to increase. 
Depending on the communication scenario, steganographic modification to the 
network traffic can be spotted by simple comparison in two distinct locations. For 
example, if scenario (4) is utilised and a steganographic method like LSB is used, 
then by comparing the packets’ payload in two different locations (e.g., in sender’s 
LAN and on some intermediate node in the external network) it is possible to uncover 
steganographic traffic modification. However, it must be emphasized that, in 
practice, realisation of a distributed warden is hard to achieve, especially for VoIP. 
 Now, let us consider again the VoIP steganography classification introduced in 
Section 1 (Fig. 2). To verify the feasibility of methods from groups S2 and S3, 
experiments on real-life VoIP connections were conducted by Mazurczyk et al. [2010]. 
The results obtained show that from group S2 only the method that introduces 
intentional losses is practically applicable, but it offers low steganographic 
bandwidth (< 1 bit/s). The other methods that employ reordering, or modification of 
inter-packet delays are impractical and easy to detect. Reordering of the RTP packets 
was never witnessed during the experiments and inter-packet delays varied so much 
because of the network conditions, that applying such steganographic techniques 
would be a difficult task and would result (if they worked at all) in a very low 
steganographic bandwidth. For methods from group S3, it was concluded based on 
the LACK example, that it can offer potentially high steganographic bandwidth when 
it tries to mimic delay spikes, the characteristic formation of packets, which can lead 
to packet drops at the receiving end. This in turn is possible by intentionally causing 
such RTP packet sequences that will surely lead to jitter buffer (receiving buffer) 
losses by causing late packet drops, or jitter buffer overflows. Thus, an effective 
steganalysis method for LACK is still desirable. 
 As mentioned in the Section 1, the main focus of the research community in the 
last decade has been dedicated to developing steganographic techniques from the S1 
group (see Fig. 2). This in turn resulted in the increased number of steganalysis 
methods developed for this group. It must be emphasised that many so called audio 
steganalysis methods were also developed for detection of hidden data in audio files 
(so called audio steganography). However, in this paper we consider only these 
detection methods that have been evaluated and proved feasible for VoIP. 
 Statistical steganalysis for LSB-based VoIP steganography was proposed by 
Dittmann et al. [2005]. They proved that it was possible to be able to detect hidden 
communication with almost a 99% success rate under the assumption that there are 
no packet losses and the steganogram is unencrypted/uncompressed. 
 Takahasi and Lee [2007] described a detection method based on calculating the 
distances between each audio signal and its de-noised residual by using different 
audio quality metrics. Then a SVM classifier is utilised for detection of the existence 
of hidden data. This scheme was tested on LSB, DSSS, FHSSS and Echo hiding 
methods and the results obtained show that for the first three algorithms the 
detection rate was about 94% and for the last it was about 73%. 
 A Mel-Cepstrum based detection, known from speaker and speech recognition, was 
introduced by Krätzer and Dittmann [2007] for the purpose of VoIP steganalysis. 
Under the assumption that a steganographic message is not permanently embedded 
from the start to the end of the conversation, the authors demonstrated that 
detection of an LSB-based steganography is efficient with a success rate of 100%. 
This work was further extended by [Krätzer and Dittmann 2008a] employing an 
SVM classifier. In [Krätzer and Dittmann 2008b] it was shown for an example of 
VoIP steganalysis that channel character specific detection performs better than 
when channel characteristic features are not considered. 
 Steganalysis of LSB steganography based on a sliding window mechanism and an 
improved variant of the previously known Regular Singular (RS) algorithm was 
proposed by Huang et al. [2011c]. Their approach provides a 64% decrease in the 
detection time over the classic RS, which makes it suitable for VoIP. Moreover, 
experimental results prove that this solution is able to detect up to five simultaneous 
VoIP covert channels with a 100% success rate. 
 Huang et al. [2011d] also introduced the steganalysis method for compressed VoIP 
speech that is based on second statistics. In order to estimate the length of the 
hidden message, the authors proposed to embed hidden data into a sampled speech 
at a fixed embedding rate, followed by embedding other information at a different 
level of data embedding. Experimental results showed that this solution not only 
allows the detection of hidden data embedded in a compressed VoIP call, but also to 
accurately estimate its size.  
 Steganalysis that relies on the classification of RTP packets (as steganographic or 
non steganographic ones) and utilises specialised random projection matrices that 
take advantage of prior knowledge about the normal traffic structure was proposed 
by Garateguy et al. [2011]. Their approach is based on the assumption that normal 
traffic packets belong to a subspace of a smaller dimension (first method), or that 
they can be included in a convex set (second method). Experimental results showed 
that the subspace-based model proved to be very simple and yielded very good 
performance, while the convex set-based one was more powerful, but more time-
consuming. 
 Arackaparambil et al. [2012] analysed how in distribution-based steganalysis, the 
length of the window of the detection threshold and in which the distribution is 
measured, should be depicted to provide the greatest chance for success. The results 
obtained showed how these two parameters should be set for achieving a high rate of 
detection, whilst maintaining a low rate of false positives. This approach was 
evaluated based on real-life VoIP traces and a prototype implementation of a simple 
steganographic method and was proved efficient. 
 A method for detecting CNV-QIM (Complementary Neighbour Vertices-
Quantisation Index Modulation) steganography in G.723.1 voice streams was 
described Li and Huang [2012]. This approach is to build the two models: distribution 
histogram and state transition model to quantify the codeword distribution 
characteristics. Based on these two models, feature vectors for training the classifiers 
for steganalysis are obtained. The technique is implemented by constructing an SVM 
classifier and the results show that it can achieve an average detecting success rate 
of 96% when the duration of the G.723.1 compressed speech bit stream is less than 5 
seconds. 
 A steganalysis method for TranSteg based on MFCC (Mel-Frequency Cepstral 
Coefficients) parameters and GMMs (Gaussian Mixture Models) was developed and 
tested for various overt/covert codec pairs in a single warden scenario with double 
transcoding [Janicki et al. 2012b]. The proposed method allowed for efficient 
detection of some codec pairs e.g., G.711/G.726, with an average detection probability 
of 94.6%, Speex7/G.729 with 89.6%, or Speex7/iLBC, with 86.3% detectability. Other 
codecs pairs remained more resistant to detection e.g., for the pair iLBC/AMR 
average detection probability of 67% was achieved. Successful detection of TranSteg 
using the proposed steganalysis method requires at least 2 s of speech data to 
analyse. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We are currently facing an almost ubiquitous proliferation of VoIP. Skype, VoIP-
ready Android phones and numerous VoIP ISPs and open source communities have 
resulted in a large number of users and a huge volume of traffic generated. This in 
turn, together with the number of protocols that form IP telephony, make it a perfect 
steganographic carrier that can be exploited for good (e.g., to enrich the service) or 
bad (e.g., to enable confidential data exfiltration) intentions. Thus, it is not surprising 
that clandestine communication based on steganophony is becoming reality and soon 
can be widely utilized with good or bad intentions.  
 The main focus of the research community during the last decade has been mainly 
dedicated to those VoIP steganography methods that modify the speech that is 
exchanged between the calling parties, or the codec that the speech is encoded with. 
Surprisingly, a lot of research effort is still devoted for improving methods like LSB. 
Researchers have also targeted various VoIP-specific protocols like SIP with SDP, 
RTP and RTCP as steganographic carriers. Little effort has been devoted to the 
deployment of the methods that modify the time relations between packets in the 
RTP stream, which is an important branch of the network steganography field. This 
is mainly because such solutions are rather hard to deploy practically as they usually 
offer low steganographic bandwidth and require synchronisation. However for certain 
applications like flow watermarking that do not require high steganographic 
bandwidth they were proved efficient and feasible [Wang et al. 2005]. An interesting 
research direction could be development of hybrid methods that modify both VoIP 
PDU’s and their time relations as it has been proved that such methods offer decent 
steganographic bandwidth while still being undetectable [Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski 2008b]. Moreover, general techniques that improve undetectability are 
currently closely analysed [Tian et al. 2011b].  
 Of course this survey does not exhaust all of the possibilities of hidden 
communication that can be used with VoIP. More work will surely continue to appear 
on information hiding in the carried speech as well as in the VoIP-specific protocols. 
Obviously some of existing steganographic methods for other carriers could be 
successfully “transferred” to VoIP environment e.g. [Yu et al. 2007, Ling et al. 2011]. 
However, each method must be carefully evaluated due to specific requirements for 
IP telephony as a real-time service. 
 At the same time the steganalysis methods are present, but they are not universal 
and efficient enough to be practically deployed in the telecommunication network 
environment to perform real-time detection. Similarly like for steganographic 
methods some existing steganalysis solutions could be utilized also for VoIP 
steganography e.g. [Gianvecchio and Wang 2011; Jia et al. 2009] but as in the 
previous case their efficiency were not proved for real-time services. 
 Both, steganographic methods with the numerous ways to make them even more 
hidden are being developed in parallel with the methods of detection. For every VoIP 
steganography method developed a new steganalysis solution is sooner or later 
proposed. Then, even more stealthy approaches of previously known methods are 
developed and their detection must once again catch up. This form of “arms race” will 
surely not come to an end in the foreseeable future. 
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